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Abstract 
Transitions are structural innovations of societal systems in reaction to wicked 
problems threatening development. In this paper we develop a transactional model of 
transitions based on Coleman’s linear system of action. The model implemented has 
the characteristics of a dissipative system.  A variation and selection algorithm 
favoring the selection of relatively dependent actors into the social system forces the 
system away from equilibrium. Exchange of control, according to Coleman the 
driving force behind social action, accounts for dissipation and brings the social 
system back to equilibrium. We expect the Transactional Model of Transitions to 
show complex dynamics. Power law behavior and punctuated equilibrium are of 
special interest, as these are closely connected to hypotheses on social dynamics 
developed in the literature on societal transitions and system innovations. We 
present simulation results for various variation and selection procedures, interpret 
their meaning in the light of societal transitions and system innovations and discuss 
their conformity with actual social processes. Our results show that the Transactional 
Model of Transitions indeed shows complex dynamics, mirrors some of the 
characteristics of transition dynamics and is promising for further research on 
Transition Management. We did not yet find conclusive evidence of evolution to the 
edge of chaos, self-organized criticality and/or power law behavior.  
 Text 
1. Introduction 
Transitions are structural innovations of societal systems in reaction to wicked problems threatening 
development (Rotmans 2005, 2001; Van der Brugge et al., 2005). Transition Management (Rotmans, 
2005; Rotmans et al., 2001; Van der Brugge et al., 2005) is developed as a mode of governance aiming 
to deliberately guide transitions towards sustainable development (Bruggink, 2005). In this paper we 
present the first outlines of a transactional model (Timmermans, 2004; Timmermans and Beroggi, 
2000) of the social dynamics involved in transitions. The model is developed as a tool to evaluate 
existing instruments and design new instruments and approaches in Transition Management and is 
rooted in Coleman’s Social Theory and the Linear System of Action (Coleman, 1990).  
Rotmans et al., have introduced the concepts of transition theory and Transition Management as a new 
integrative approach in the field of sustainability and governance in order to deal with persistent 
problems (Rotmans, 2005; Rotmans et al., 2000; Van der Brugge et al., 2005, Kemp et al., 1998). The 
transition framework offers analytical tools for structuring and explaining the dynamic behavior of 
societal systems, such as transport, energy supply, agriculture and water management. Transition 
management attempts to influence, facilitate, stimulate, organize and guide processes that contribute to 
the transition. 
Transitions are often illustrated with S-shaped curves (Figure 1). Although this is a simple aggregated 
curve, the underlying transition dynamics are complex interaction processes between markets, 
networks, institutions, technologies, policies, individual behavior and autonomous trends in the 
economic, ecological, socio-cultural and institutional domain. From a complex adaptive systems (CAS) 
perspective, transitions are system transformations between two temporal (dynamic) equilibrium states 
(attractors). In between there is a period of rapid change during which the system undergoes 
irreversible re-organization (Rotmans, 1994).  
According to Rotmans (Rotmans et al., 2000) the general pattern of evolution during the four phases is 
the following. In the pre-development phase, the system dynamics do not change visibly. In the take-
off phase, the structure of the system begins to change as the result of (1) the emergence of innovations 
and (2) destabilization of the existing regime. In the acceleration phase, structural transformation of the 
system takes place. In the stabilization phase the new pattern of system dynamics reaches a new 
dynamic equilibrium.  
The transition framework is rooted in CAS theory (Holland, 1995; Kauffman, 1995; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984) post-normal science (Ravetz, 1999), while integrating concepts from governance 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999), evolutionary economics (Arthur, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982), 
innovation studies (Smits & Kuhlmann, 2004) and technological transitions (Geels & Kemp, 2000). In 
this paper we are especially interested in the CAS characteristics of social transitions. Concepts like 
punctuated equilibrium and self-organized criticality (Bak and Sneppen, 1993) operating in a social 
system carry the promise for an explanation of the unpredictable behavior and occurrence of societal 
transitions and the proposed S-shape dynamics of transitions. Power law behavior is congruent with the 
observation that in societal systems small changes happen all the time, while changes with a big 
impact, transitions, are rare.  
We aim to develop a model of social dynamics showing complex behavior and the characteristics of 
CAS described above including regime formation and S-curve dynamics as postulated by transition 
theory (Rotmans, 2005; Rotmans et al., 2000; Van der Brugge et al., 2005). Our starting point is 
Coleman’s Social Theory and the LSA (Coleman, 1990). This theory seems promising for this purpose, 
both from a theoretical as from a modeling perspective. 
Figure 1 Typical development and stages in a transition 
 A transition is the shift between two dynamic equilibriums that can be described by a set of system 
indicators. In the transition process, four phases can be distinguished. In the predevelopment these 
indicators change only marginally. In the take-off and acceleration phase the indicators change 
with increasing speed. In the stabilization a new equilibrium is reached (Rotmans et al., 2002). 
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Social theories are theories that aim to explain social developments.  The Social Theory of James S. 
Coleman explains social development as the result of exchange of control over issues between actors 
and belongs to the group of social theories that apply exchange theorizing and rational choice theory. 
Coleman’s Social Theory and similar or adapted theories have been widely applied in policy analysis 
(Timmermans 2004, Timmermans and Beroggi 2005, Schouten et al., 2000; Stokman and Berveling, 
1998; Stokman and Zeggelink 1996; Pappi and Knoke, 1991).   
In Coleman’s Social Theory, profitable transactions between purposive actors are the primary 
explanatory factors. According to Coleman, in the minimal social systems there are two kinds of 
elements and two ways in which they are related. The elements are actors, and issues over which they 
have control and in which they have some interest.  Social development is perceived of as a negotiation 
process in which agreements are reached on the exchange of control between actors in a social system. 
The quantitative implementation of this theory, the Linear System of Action (LSA), captures this 
exchange process in a micro-economic model. We use the LSA as the basis for the Transactional 
Model of the social dynamics involved in transitions. 
The LSA is an equilibrium model and only covers part of social dynamics. It covers normal social 
development in the pre-development and stabilization phases of the S-curve. It does however, not cover 
the rapid and fundamental change observed in societal transitions. In terms of the LSA, transitions 
involve a fundamental shift in the distributions of control and interest defining the LSA.  
In the next section first the LSA will be presented in more detail. Next the model will be extended to 
cover the radical changes and related dynamics of transitions observed in real social systems and 
described in transition theory. 
2. The Linear System of Action 
Coleman’s Social Theory uses a systems approach to social explanation and incorporates three 
components. Two of these involve the relation between the system and the system units. These 
relations are called respectively the micro-to-macro and the macro-to-micro transition. The third 
component is called the individual-level theory of action and covers the actions of the individual actors 
(Figure 1). 
 3 
 Figure 2 Systems approach to social explanation (after Coleman,  1990) 
Arrow one is the macro-to-micro transition and depicts the influence of action determining the 
decisions of individual. In turn arrow two depicts the micro-to-macro transition and resembles the 
influence of the actions of individual actors on system development. Arrow three is the individual 
level theory of action.   
In the minimal social systems there are two kinds of elements and two ways in which they are related. 
The elements are actors, and things over which they have control and in which they have some interest 
(Coleman, 1990). These things can be called resources, issues or events, depending on their character. 
It is each actor’s interest in resources, issues or events under another’s control that lead purposive 
actors (Weber, 1958 [1904]) to engage in interactions involving exchanges of control. In these 
transactions actors maximize their realization of interests. Exchanges of control continue until the 
system of action reaches equilibrium, at which point all actors control those issues that most interest 
them, subject to the power of their initial resources.  
1 2 
Macro 
Micro 
System development 
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The Linear System of Action (LSA) is the formal implementation of this theory and is 
based on micro-economic theory and its use of utility theory and the more rigid 
notion of rationality, as developed in economics. 
In micro-economic theory, the utility Ui of actor i can be specified algebraically as a function of the 
amount of each good m held by actor i: 
),( 21 imiiii cccUU ΚΚ=            (1) 
The development of the LSA deviates from micro-economic theory in its prescription of a specific form 
of the utility function Ui: 
miii x
im
x
i
x
ii cccU ΚΚ21 21=    (2) 
Where Ui is the total utility of actor i, cij is the amount of good j held by actor i and where xji expresses 
the contribution that good j makes towards the utility of individual i 
while  and . The first constraint implies that each good contributes ∑ =0≥jix
jpositively, if at all, to individual i‘s utility. The second constraint implies declining marginal utility. 
This multiplicative form of a utility function is known in economics as a Cobb-Douglas-type utility 
function.
jix 1
                                                       
1 In the formulas above the quantities cij correspond directly to control of actor i over issue j 
and the quantities xji correspond directly to interest of actor i in issue j. Furthermore, cij and xji are 
scaled arbitrarily to 1: 
∑
=
=
n
i
Cij
1
1        and           (3) ∑
=
=
m
i
Xji
1
1
 
1 In fact the Cobb-Douglas function is a production function, relating production to the input of capital and labor. The utility function used by 
Coleman in the LSA has the same shape as the Cobb-Douglas production function.
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 In matrix notation the matrix C denotes the control of actor i over good j, while the matrix X depicts the 
interest of actor j in good i: 
ijcC = ijxX =      and         (4) 
In a competitive equilibrium, each issue has a single price, vj, the rate at which it is exchanged in all 
transactions. Consequently all actors have a fixed amount of power, which is equal to the sum of the 
value of their resources: 
∑
=
=
m
i
jiji vcr
1
      (5) 
Combining the values of all j issues and the power of all i actors in the system results in the value 
vector v and the power vector r: 
jvv = irr =     and                        (6) 
In the LSA, all actors engage in exchanges of control in order to maximize their utility. This exchange 
process leads to an equilibrium distribution of control, the competitive equilibrium. The competitive 
equilibrium for the LSA with initial control distribution C and distribution of interest X is reached at 
the equilibrium distribution of control, C*, which is calculated as: 
C* ’= DrX Dv-1       (7) 
Where Dr is an n x m matrix with diagonal elements ri and Dv is an m x m matrix with diagonal 
elements vj. Depending on the available data, C and X or C* and X, the missing parameters of the model 
can be derived from the matrix equation by substituting: 
r = CXr     or      v = XCv     (8) 
where the power vector r or the value vector v can be calculated as: 
-1 -1r = (I – CX + En)  e and v = (I – XC + En1 m)  e  (9) m1
With En a square matrix with elements 1/n and Em a square matrix with elements 1/ , both e  and em n1 m1 are 
defined as n x 1 and m x 1 column from these matrices; I is the identity matrix.  Figure 2 presents a 
general layout of the LSA.  
Figure 3 Matrices X and C of the Linear System of Action 
The matrices of interest X and initial control C define the LSA. X is an m x n matrix with row-wise 
m issues and column-wise n actors. C is an n x m matrix, with row-wise n actors and column- wise 
m issues.  
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 3. A Transactional Model of Transitions 
The LSA presented above is an equilibrium model. In the LSA there are no changes in the equilibrium 
values of issues, or in the distribution of power over actors. Societal transitions however exactly 
involve such changes or shifts from one dynamic equilibrium to another.  
According to Coleman three sources of such a shift in equilibrium exist (Coleman, 1990). First, issues 
can enter or leave the system. Second, new actors can enter the system, and third actors and issues can 
simultaneously enter or leave the social system (Coleman, 1990: p. 895-896). All three developments 
result in a shift in the distribution of interest and control within the LSA and consequently a new 
equilibrium. Coleman does elaborate on the reasons for actors or issues to enter or leave the system for 
the specific case of single- and double-contingency panics (Coleman, 1990:p. 899-931) but does not 
present a more general explanation.  
To describe the social dynamics involved in transitions, a more general explanatory theory of 
equilibrium shifts in the LSA is required. To model the dynamics of social transitions, we propose a 
variation and selection procedure based on a rational approach at the system level. For individual actors 
in the social system is seems rational to select actors into the social system that increase their own 
opportunities for exchange of control and thus realizations of their individual interest while excluding 
actors that do not contribute. At the system level this rational maximizing behavior process of 
individual actors leads to a collective outcome in which actors adding opportunities for exchange, and 
thus forcing the system away from equilibrium, are selected into the social system. 
Whether we define this mechanism as a pure selection mechanism operating on existing actors outside 
the social system studied or as a mutation selection procedure which forces less favored actor to mutate 
by changing their interests in order to continue to be a member of the social system, is an interesting 
point of debate but not relevant for the dynamics of the model proposed. We favor the mutation 
selection procedure as it links to the idea that an important difference between the social dynamics in 
equilibrium conditions and during transitions is the shift in equilibrium of the LSA caused by changing 
interests of actors under transition conditions. This choice is further bolstered by the observation of the 
two prominent authors on rational choice theories. Michael Hechter (Hechter, 1987, 1988) and James 
S. Coleman (1986) in their theories of group solidarity. These theories explain the emergence of groups 
from the rational self-interested behavior of individual actors. Coleman’s line of thinking develops 
around the need for actors to interact in order to produce joined goods contributing to the realization of 
the interests of the individual actor.  
To implement the mutation selection procedure and the link to the LSA, numerous procedures can be 
developed. Each of these procedures uses different criteria to answer the two relevant questions: which 
actor is replaced, mutated or changed? And to what extend and in accordance to which procedure are 
the characteristics of the selected actor mutated or changed? A wide range of selection and mutation 
procedures is available and many of them were tried to get an overview and increased insight in the 
characteristics of the model. In this paper we present three alternative selection mutation procedures.  
First we present a procedure, ‘replace’ in which the most self-dependent actor in the system is selected 
and is completely replaced by a new actor with randomly generated distributions of interest and control 
according to a random permutation of the (preference) order of interests and control. In fact this 
procedures simulates a situation where a new actor is selected into the system from outside and no 
relation between the actors inside and outside the social system exists.  The procedure does not 
conserve the total power of the actor, which means a sudden change in the distribution of power over 
the actors in the social system is possible. The procedure is not rational at system level, because it 
seems unlikely that powerful actors within the system will select a more powerful actor into the system. 
Second we use a procedure, ‘mutate’ in which the most self-dependent actor in the system is selected 
and is mutated by exchanging interest and control for the most self-dependent issue and a randomly 
chosen second issue. This procedure is a mutation procedure that establishes a feedback between the 
social system, the selected actor and the mutation itself. From the viewpoint of an individual actor this 
mutation procedure is rational, because it minimizes change as it only involves the swap of two 
preferences in the order of interest and control over the issues. 
In the third procedure, ‘change’ interest and control of the most self-d nden tor for most -
dependent issue are replaced by a random number within the range  to  and  to  
where n is the most self-dependent actor.  ‘Mutate’ and ‘change’ both conserve the total power of 
selected actors and the total interest in the selected issue. This makes the procedure rational from the 
perspective of the social system modeled, as no sudden change in the distribution of power over the 
epe t ac the selfmin max min max
njc njc jnx jnx
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 actor can occur. ‘Change’ is similar to ‘mutate’ but increases the range and magnitude of possible 
changes. In short the three procedure implemented are: 
 
1. ‘replace’: replaces the interest and control distributions of the most self-dependent actor 
2. ‘mutate’: mutates the interest and control of the most self-dependent actor for the most self-
dependent issue  
3. ‘change’: changes the interest and control of the most self dependent actor for the most self-
dependent issue 
  
All three procedures proposed, require the selection of the most self-dependent actor and for ‘mutate’ 
and 'change’ also the most self-dependent issue. When the matrices X and C of the LSA are known the 
matrix of inter actor dependencies, Dact, can be calculated as: 
 
Dact = C*X     (10) 
 
The main diagonal of matrix Dact gives the self-dependency of actors (Timmermans, 2004), that 
indicates to which extend actors are independent of the other actors in realizing their interests. It 
follows logically that the most self-dependent actor is also the most independent actor in the social 
system and consequently offers the minimum contribution in terms of potential exchange of control. 
This actor, with index n, is selected for mutation. In addition for ‘mutate’ and ‘change’ the most self-
dependent issue is selected. The matrix of dependency of issues, D  is calculated as: iss
 
 = X*C     (11) Diss
 
Again the main diagonal gives us the self-dependence of issues, indicating that developments in this 
issue are relatively independent of the development on other issues (Timmermans, 2004). On this 
diagonal the most self-dependent issue, m, can be selected. The interest of the most independent actor n 
in the most independent issue m contributes least to the potential for exchange of control in the LSA 
and therefore is the most logical spot for the mutation or change to occur.  
In case of ‘mutate’ the mutation is implemented by exchanging the values x  in the matrix X and cmn nm in 
matix C of for the two most self-dependent issues, while keeping total control of the mutated actor 
unchanged by normalizing the vector to its original length. In case of ‘change’ the mutation procedure 
continues by replacing x  in the matrix X and cmn nm in matrix C of the LSA with a random number 
smaller or equal to the maximum xmi of the matrix X and the maximum cnj of the matrix C, while 
keeping the total control of the mutated actor unchanged by normalizing the vector to its original 
length. 
Next we present simulation results of the model using the three procedures described and their 
reference cases in which selection of the mutated actor is based on a random procedure. For each model 
we calculated the development of the distance from equilibrium, with and without exchange and the 
distribution of the exchanges. All simulations are made using a randomly generated LSA with 9 actors 
and 15 issues. The matrices X and C are generated by random permutation of the vector (1.. 9) for the 
actors and (1 .. 15) for the issues and normalizing the resulting matrices column wise. This procedure 
resembles the ability of human actors to derive their preferences up to a strong preference order 
through paired comparisons (Beroggi, 2000, 1999; Timmermans, 2004).  All simulations are continued 
for 25.000 iterations. The model is implemented in the Matlab environment. Matlab is also used for 
data processing and presentation. 
4. Simulation results of three alternative models 
To present and evaluate the alternative procedures, we use three characteristic parameters: 
 
- distance from equilibrium 
- maximum bilateral exchange 
- frequency distribution of maximum bilateral exchange 
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 Distance from equilibrium, , indicates the amount of exchange of control required to reach 
equilibrium from the current state of the current model and is calculated as: 
φcr
∑ −=
ij
ij
r
ij
rr ccc *φ   (11) 
where  is the actual control of decision maker i over issue j,  is the equilibrium *ij
r cij
r c
control of decision maker i over issue j and r is the number of the iteration. 
Maximum bilateral exchange potential is the highest exchange of control for a pair of decision makers 
and corresponding pair of issues, available in the model. For all pairs of decision makers i and k and 
pairs of issues j and l, the maximum bilateral exchange potential, 
φ
ikjlc , is calculated as: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ φφφ
klc
r
ijc
r
ikjl
r c ,minmax φφφφ kl
r
ij
r
kl
r
ij
r cccc +≠+   ∀       (12) 
and: 
φφφφ
kl
r
ij
r
kl
r
ij
r cccc +=+ocikjlr =φ       ∀       (13) 
where: 
*
ik
r
ik
r
ik
r ccc −=φ   (14) 
and: 
*
jl
r
jl
r
jl
r ccc −=φ   (15) 
The expressions behind the ‘for all sign’, ∀, in Equations 12 and 13 shows the existence or non-
existence of a double coincidence of wants. Last we use the frequency distribut- 
ion of to characterize the results of the simulations.  φikjlc
In the following some characteristic results are presented and used to conclude on the characteristics 
and applicability of the resulting transactional model for simulating societal transitions. 
Figure 4 presents the distance from equilibrium or potential for exchange of control for the three 
procedures. For ‘replace’ and ‘change’ the variations in are limited and remain close to their value 
at the start of the simulation. These mutation procedures don’t show a clear benefit in terms of potential 
for exchange at system level and in case of ‘mutate’ the potential for exchange even declines at the start 
of the simulation. Further inspection of the date shows that in ‘replace’ mutated actors manage to enter 
and survive in the system. However, the mutation procedure does not produce actors strong enough to 
move the social system further from equilibrium and  remains close to the average value of 10. 
This is caused by the fact that the random permutation procedure to generate the new actor is similar to 
the procedure used to generate the initial model and overrules the effect of selecting the most self-
dependent actor for mutation. This conclusion is supported by the frequency distribution of exchanges 
generated by replace procedure, which is approximately a normal distribution (Figure 5). 
φcr
φcr
The frequency distribution of maximum bilateral exchanges for ‘change’, as presented in Figure 6b, is 
very irregular. Numerous local maxima exist. The frequency distribution seems to be the result of an 
addition of numerous frequency distributions, each with its own mean and standard deviation. The plot 
of the maximum bilateral exchanges of Figure 6a supports this conclusion. This plot shows more or 
less punctuated pattern where extended periods of average exchanges alternate with periods of 
relatively high exchanges of considerable duration. As can be inferred from both Figure 4 and Figure 
6b, this behavior becomes apparent after circa 7500 iterations. 
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 Figure 4 Distance from equilibrium for ‘replace’, ‘mutate’ and ‘change’ 
 
In case of ‘mutate’, after an initialization period of around 1500 iterations in which declines from 9 
to around 8, the mutated actors don’t survive in the system anymore and the system reaches a dynamic 
equilibrium in which one actor is mutated infinitely.  
φcr
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.
x 10
4
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
iterations [-]
di
st
an
ce
 f
ro
m
 e
qu
ili
br
iu
m
 [
-]
change 
replace 
mutate 
The results of ‘change’ are of more interest. Here the mutation procedure pushes the social system far 
from equilibrium. New actor move into the system all the time and survive for shorter or longer periods 
and move out of the system after they are ruled out by new actors adding even more potential for 
exchange. 
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 Figure 5 exchanges (a) and frequency distribution of exchanges (b) for ‘replace’ 
0.3
 
As a reference case, the selection of the actor to be replaced, mutated or changed based on self-
dependency is replaced by random selection. For ‘replace’ and ‘mutate’, selection of the actor based on 
self-dependency or random does not influence the results of the simulations. Distance from 
equilibrium, maximum bilateral exchange and frequency distributions of exchanges remain similar. 
Also the frequency distributions of maximum bilateral exchanges are close to a normal distribution, 
although the influence of the initialization period spurs the results initially. Only for ‘change’ a clear 
difference between the simulations results for random selection of the actor to be mutated and selection 
based on self-dependence is apparent. The difference, however, is only a matter of scale; while the 
characteristics of the behavior are similar; selection of the actor based on self-dependence moves the 
social system further away from equilibrium and results in bigger maximum bilateral exchanges 
(Figure 6). When also the selection of the issue to be changed is replaced by a random procedure, the 
social system does not move away from equilibrium and the frequency distribution of the exchanges 
resembles a normal distribution.  
Figure 6   exchanges (a) and frequency distribution of exchanges (b) for ‘change’ 
 
We conclude that selection of the most self-dependent actor and thus establishing a relation between 
the social system and the actor mutated has a decisive influence on model behavior. Only then the 
social system moves away from equilibrium and thus increases the opportunities of the actors included 
in the system to realize their interests. This proves that changing the most self-dependent actor in he 
social system is a rational action for the social system as a whole. This is an important conclusion in the 
light of the rational action theory applied in the LSA, as non-rational behavior at the system level 
would violate the assumption underlying the model itself. 
From the above we conclude that the behavior of the TMT using ‘change’ is of most interest from the 
perspective of modeling societal transitions. The simulations show a strong push of the social system 
away from equilibrium while maximum bilateral exchanges are relatively large and show signs of 
punctuated or periodic behavior on a long time scale. Furthermore the procedure ‘change’ is a rational 
action at the system level. It remains to be seen however if and to which extend the mutation procedure 
satisfies the rationality assumptions for the individual actors. We leave the more detailed analysis 
required to answered this question for further research.  
In the next paragraph the TMT incorporating procedure 3, ‘change’ is studied more extensively. 
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 Figure 7   exchange with out (a) and with selection of most self-dependent actor for ‘change’ 
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5. Characteristics of the Transactional Model of Transition 
The model described in this paper is developed to model, study and evaluate tools and strategies for 
transition management. In this section we evaluate model behavior regarding two characteristics 
pertinent to societal transitions. Rotmans and Kemp state that transitions (Rotmans, 2005; Rotmans et 
al., 2001; Van der Brugge et al., 2005; Kemp et al., 1998): 
 
- require a change of regime 
- develop in accordance with an S-curve 
 
In transition theory, a regime is both characterized by a ‘ruling’ set of actors and a ‘ruling’ set of 
substantive characteristics, like institutions, practices, structures and artifacts or infrastructure 
(Rotmans, 2005; Van der Brugge et al., 2005, Kemp et al., 1998). At an abstract level, these regime 
characteristics translate into a distribution of power of actors and value of issues in the LSA. Power of 
actors is a straightforward concept, both from definition of regimes in transition theory as from the 
LSA (equation 6). The translation of the substantive characteristics of the regime into values of issues 
is however less clear-cut. In the LSA, at the system level all issues obtain a value based on the interest 
of actors in the respective issues. If we characterize and describe the substantive elements of a regime 
with issues and the level up to which these issues are served by the current regime with the values, the 
LSA gives us a quantitative characterization of the substantive elements of the regime. For example if 
sustainability is one of the issues included in the LSA, a high value of the issue sustainability in the 
LSA indicates that the current regime highly values issues of sustainability when taking decisions. For 
a method to define these issues for a real world social system we refer to Timmermans (Timmermans, 
2004; Schouten et al., 2001; Timmermans and Beroggi, 2000). 
Figure 8 Exchange and regime changes 
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 The bar graphs inserted present a representative distribution of power for the regime between the 
regime shifts indicated by the dotted lines. 
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In Figure 8 the exchanges of control for the model are given and shifts in de power regime are 
indicated. The bar graphs give a representative distribution of power over the actors for the period 
between two regime changes. A regime change is defined as a persistent change of the most powerful 
actor. The persistence is indicated with a threshold; only if the new actor stays in power for more than 
‘threshold’ iterations a new regime is installed. For the analysis in Figure 8 a threshold of 400 is used.  
From Figure 8 it can be seen that from an almost uniform distribution of power at the start of the run 
after around 1000 iterations a regime emerges with actor 9 as the most powerful actor.  Halfway the 
simulation a more even distribution emerges, while at the end, actor 8 takes over and develops into an 
extremely powerful actor possessing almost two times the power of actor 1, the second powerful actor. 
From Figure 8 it appears that the regime changes more or less coincide with changes in the average and 
standard deviation of the exchanges, indicating that the new regime is not only characterized by a new 
distribution of power, but also by a specific average and range of exchanges.  
If a smaller threshold is used, far more regime changes occur. However, frequent changes of regime are 
limited to specific periods and long periods of stable regimes remain. The periods of frequent regime 
change are periods of transition, a struggle between the actors to take over the regime. Only after some 
time one of the actor takes over and installs a new stable regime.  
The model also shows changes in the issue regime, indicated by a change in the most valuable issue. 
However, these are less frequent. Power and value regime changes do not normally occur at the same 
time. From the above we conclude that the model indeed shows the development of regimes and regime 
changes as expected in transition theory. 
Figure 9 presents the maximum bilateral exchanges and the cumulative exchange for iteration 5000 to 
25000. The first 5000 iterations are left out, because they belong to the initiation period in which the 
model is loaded. The accumulation is taken over the maximum bilateral exchange minus average 
maximum bilateral exchange. The curve thus identifies periods of above average exchange and periods 
of under average exchange. The most important conclusion from Figure 9 is the alternation of long 
periods of less than average exchange and periods of more than average exchange. Although the 
calculation of the cumulative exchange is sensitive to the period that is taken, it is clear that periods of 
fast change alternate with periods of stagnation. The changes in the slope of the cumulative exchange 
curve coincide with the change in characteristics of the exchanges. Without subtracting the average, the 
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 result will be an ever-increasing curve with alternating periods of fast increase and slow increase, 
resembling a sequence of S-curves as hypothesized by transition theory. 
 
 
Figure 9  Exchange and cumulative exchange 
The full line presents the exchanges of control over time. The dotted line is obtained by subtracting 
the average exchange from the actual exchanges and cumulating the result. A descending trend in 
cumulative exchanges indicates periods of less than average exchange, while an ascending trend 
indicates periods of above average exchange or transitions. The iteration axes runs from 5000 to 
25000 excluding the initialization period. 
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6. Discussion and further research 
The first experiences with the Transactional Model of Transitions (TMT) shows that the LSA 
combined with a suitable variation and selection procedure, produces simulation results that mirror 
some of the main characteristics of transitions in a social system. Especially the emergence of regimes 
and the alternation of periods of high exchange of control with periods of low exchange of control are 
of interest. Selecting the actor to be changed, as the most self-dependent actor is an important feature of 
the model. The selection procedure establishes a feedback between the LSA and the new actor and 
causes the social system to be pushed away from equilibrium. Without selection based on self-
dependence, the model shows random behavior. 
When applying rational choice theory to model a social system, also selection of actors into the system 
should be a rational action. Replacing, mutating or changing the most self-dependent actor is rational at 
a system level, because the actor contributing least to the potential for exchange in the social system 
modeled is removed.  The mutation and selection procedure implemented, however, is still a rough 
procedures it does not guarantee the rationality of the decision at the level of individual actors. Further 
research has to be committed to the exact characteristics and effect of the change mechanism. Although 
the procedure is rational at a system level, a more refined procedure, selecting the actor based on a 
rational decision on both the individual and system levels, will probably result in a more refined 
mechanism. It remains to be seen if such a mechanism will again mirror the characteristics of societal 
transitions. 
The model is developed as a simulation tool for testing Transition Management. Important instruments 
of transition management are visioning (Rotmans 2005; Van der Brugge et al., 2005) and strategic 
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 niche management (Geels and Kemp, 1998). In terms of interest and control, visioning can be 
translated into a convergence of interests of actors. The result of visioning can be evaluated with the 
TMT.  
Strategic niche management aims to develop innovative alternative solutions for a problem in niches 
initially protected from market influences. In term of the LSA, alternatives are the carriers of exchange 
of control. In a social system exchange of control between actors can only be implemented when a 
practical solution exists that implements the exchange of control (Timmermans, 2004; Timmermans 
and Beroggi, 2004). Without this solution the potential for exchange remains potential, without the 
possibility of implementing the exchange in practice. This aspect of exchange of control is not touched 
upon in this paper. However, the model developed facilitates the evaluation of the effect of more 
innovative with less innovative conditions on the exchange of control and thus the speed of change. 
We conclude that the TMT developed is promising for its purpose of evaluating instruments and tools 
for transition management. The model mirrors some important characteristics of societal transitions. 
Also the model is flexible and allows for a connection to real world issues pertinent to Transition 
management. 
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